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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RECONCEPTUALIZING FEDERAL COURTS IN THE WAR ON
TERROR

JONATHAN HAFETZ*
INTRODUCTION
Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States
and Democratic Courtrooms, Professors Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis’s
tour de force of the iconography of justice and courts, draws parallels between
the U.S. detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and broader trends in
adjudication.1 Guantánamo, Resnik and Curtis argue, may be aberrational in
the extremity of its approach to detention and interrogation.2 But, they explain,
it also reflects a larger, trans-substantive shift away from public dispute
resolution, a growing reliance on administrative and other nonjudicial forms of
decisionmaking, a loosening of procedural safeguards, and a decline of judicial
independence.3 “One might well think of Guantánamo as isolated in both the
literal and legal senses,” Resnik and Curtis write.4 “But unfortunately, some of
its procedures are not as foreign to contemporary decisionmaking as one might
wish.”5
Resnik has elsewhere explored the idea of Guantánamo as exemplifying
continuity rather than change. In her article Detention, the War on Terror, and
the Federal Courts, Resnik identifies similarities between Guantánamo and the
United States’ treatment of criminal defendants, immigrants, and convicted
prisoners during the past three decades.6 She emphasizes, for example, how
these prisoners have faced increasingly harsh forms of confinement and limited

* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank Judith
Resnik and the other participants of the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture for
insightful comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank Sarah Pohlman and the editorial
staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. All errors are mine alone.
1. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 328–34 (2011).
2. Id. at 327, 334.
3. Id. at 334–37.
4. Id. at 334.
5. Id. at 334–35.
6. Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 579, 634–63 (2010).
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access to courts that mirror the treatment of Guantánamo detainees.7 Other
scholars have similarly drawn parallels between America’s treatment of
prisoners in the “war on crime” and the “war on terror.”8 Viewed from this
perspective, Guantánamo represents more of a pronounced expression of broad
trends in the U.S. legal system than a radical departure from them. And the
example that Guantánamo offers of the devolution of adjudicatory processes
from Article III courts to specialized tribunals is one that reverberates beyond
the realm of national security detentions.
Representing Justice thus provides a valuable lens through which to
examine the impact of changes in U.S. law and policy after 9/11—changes that
reflect the shifting role of courts in democracies over time. But it also prompts
consideration of how the United States’ approach to terrorism has affected our
understanding of the way that courts function, are perceived, and reflect social
values.
U.S. detentions at Guantánamo, as Resnik and Curtis note, rely on quasiadministrative structures like Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”)
and military commissions in lieu of federal courts.9 Yet, notwithstanding the
creation of such new, non-Article III forms of adjudication, federal courts will
continue to serve as the forum for at least some terrorism prosecutions,
including of individuals suspected of supporting al Qaeda and affiliated
groups. Military tribunals have not supplanted federal courts but rather
emerged as an alternative to them. Once the exclusive mechanism for the
long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects, federal courts have become one
choice on a growing menu of detention options.10
The creation of these alternative detention options has affected how federal
courts are represented and perceived. Proponents of using federal courts
increasingly emphasize their toughness as a way of demonstrating their
continued viability as a forum for terrorism prosecutions in light of forum
competition from military commissions.11 Even liberal advocacy groups have

7. Id. at 634–35.
8. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009) (comparing the wars
on terror and crime and concluding that “in some important ways, 9/11 did not change
everything”); see also Denny LeBoeuf, From the Big Easy to the Big Lie, in THE GUANTÁNAMO
LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 193–200 (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz
eds., 2009) (comparing the experience of representing capital defendants in Louisiana to that of
representing Guantánamo detainees before military commissions).
9. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 327–28.
10. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2008); Aziz Z. Huq,
Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1427–28 (2012).
11. Joshua T. Bell, Trying Al Qaeda: Bringing Terrorists to Justice, PERSP. ON TERRORISM,
Oct. 2010, at 73, 77–78, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/115/234.
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shown an increasing tendency to justify federal courts based on their ability to
deliver convictions rather than to protect individual rights or deal evenhandedly with the accused.12
At the same time, federal courts are criticized for risking disclosure of
classified or other sensitive information, infringing on executive prerogatives,
and undermining military and intelligence operations.13 These criticisms have
not only helped legitimize military alternatives to federal criminal prosecution
for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects; they also have supplied
justifications for denying civil litigants—particularly, victims of torture,
arbitrary detention, and other forms of mistreatment—a judicial remedy and
for dismissing legal challenges to controversial government programs under
various justiciability doctrines.
This Article will explore the ways in which Guantánamo and the war on
terror more generally have altered the perception and operation of federal
courts.
Part I describes the growth after 9/11 of a new type of military detention
system that provides an alternative to Article III-court prosecutions of
terrorism suspects. Part II examines how this parallel military detention
system has affected the way federal courts are defined and represented as a
forum for terrorism prosecutions. Part III looks at federal courts from the
perspective of their role in providing a forum for plaintiffs seeking redress for
torture, unlawful detention, and related abuses. It describes how many of the
same reasons cited in opposition of federal criminal prosecution of terrorism
suspects are invoked—often by federal judges themselves—to prevent federal
court adjudication of civil damages litigation arising out of government
misconduct during counterterrorism operations. Part IV examines federal
courts from another vantage point, describing their engagement with the new,
post-9/11 military detention system through the exercise of habeas corpus
12. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at ii (2009); ACLU Urges Obama Administration to Stand by
Decision to Try 9/11 Suspects in Federal Criminal Courts, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar.
19, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-urges-obama-administration-stand-deci
sion-try-911-suspects-federal-criminal-c (“Since 9/11, there have been over 300 terrorism-related
convictions in federal court. The military commissions have completed only three terrorismrelated cases, with two of the three convicted defendants having served relatively short sentences
they have already completed. . . . Attorney General Holder’s decision to use federal criminal
courts was the right decision for national security and the right decision for the rule of law.”);
Ghailani Trial Underscores Federal Courts’ Ability To Prosecute Terrorism Suspects, Says
ACLU, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/ghaila
ni-trial-underscores-federal-courts-ability-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-say; see also 157 CONG.
REC. S6752 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
13. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Prosecuting Suspected Terrorists: The Role of Civilian
Courts, ADVANCE, Fall 2008, at 63, 63.
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jurisdiction. Here, federal courts have performed two, inter-related functions:
first, articulating general rules and principles to govern military detention and
trial, and second, acting as quasi national security courts by reviewing the
validity of individual prisoners’ military confinement. While federal courts
have imposed some constraints on the government’s ability to hold terrorism
suspects outside the criminal justice system, they have largely accommodated
the new forms of military detention that emerged after 9/11 under the rubric of
the war on terrorism and have shown considerable deference to the
government’s allegations in individual cases.
I. MILITARY DETENTION AND THE OPTIONALITY OF FEDERAL COURT
PROSECUTION
Before 9/11, criminal prosecution represented the exclusive method in the
United States for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects.14 This
exclusivity resulted from the government’s treatment of terrorism as a law
enforcement matter. While the United States periodically engaged in military
strikes as part of overseas counterterrorism operations, it maintained a civilianlaw framework for the treatment of terrorism suspects.15 The United States
could, where appropriate, deport a suspect under immigration law16 or, if
seized abroad, render that suspect to another country.17 But if the government
desired a suspect’s long-term incarceration, its only option was to prosecute
and convict him in federal court.18
After 9/11, the United States has created a new legal framework for
detaining terrorism suspects outside the criminal justice system. Relying on

14. Although alien terrorism suspects also could be incapacitated under federal immigration
law, this typically constituted short-term detention, pending the alien’s removal from the United
States. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 411–12,
115 Stat. 272, 345–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1189, 1226a (2006)) (supplying terrorismrelated definitions and requiring the detention of suspected terrorists); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001) (explaining the purposes of immigration removal and
asserting that “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”).
15. Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217,
1217–21 (2002).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2006).
17. In the mid-1990s, the United States started to send suspected terrorists seized abroad to
foreign countries for detention, as opposed to bringing them to the United States to face trial
there. See JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 52 (2011); see also Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered
Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336–
37 (2007) (noting the development of the prior use of “renditions to justice” during the 1980s to
bring suspects captured abroad to the United States for trial).
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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both the 2001 congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”)19 and his inherent commander-in-chief power, President Bush
claimed the authority to treat certain terrorism suspects as “enemy combatants”
in a global “war on terrorism.”20 Detainees, the Bush Administration asserted,
could be held as enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict or, where
appropriate, tried by military commission for war crimes.21 While the
Administration resisted definitional clarity on the scope of its detention
authority, it claimed that this authority was without geographic limitation and
included members and supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces, even if they did not directly participate in hostilities.22 It further
asserted that those held as enemy combatants had no right to access U.S. courts
if they were held outside the sovereign United States23 and had de minimis
judicial review if they were detained inside the country.24
This war on terrorism framework underlay the detention without charge of
hundreds of individuals at Guantánamo, Bagram, and CIA-run “black sites” as
well as the military detention of three people inside the United States.25 It also
supplied the rationale for transferring prisoners between detention facilities as
well as rendering prisoners to foreign countries for torture and other abusive
interrogation methods through the practice known as “extraordinary
rendition.”26
This alternative system, however, was never intended to supplant the
federal criminal justice system. Federal criminal prosecutions of terrorism
suspects continued throughout the Bush Administration.27 There was,
moreover, significant overlap between the category of individuals who could
be subjected to war-on-terrorism confinement (whether through indefinite
enemy combatant detention or military commission prosecution), on the one
hand, or federal criminal indictment, on the other. For example, a person who
provided support to al Qaeda or assisted al Qaeda in plotting a terrorist attack
19. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
20. HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 12, 18.
21. See id. at 16, 18.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id. at 29–30.
24. See id. at 77.
25. HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 31, 48–49, 58, 76–77.
26. Id. at 52–53. Although the United States had begun rendering terrorism suspects to
foreign governments during the mid-1990s, after 9/11, the practice expanded significantly,
operated with fewer internal checks, and was no longer tied to the existence of legal proceedings
against the suspect in the receiving country. Id.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2009 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY pt. 1, at 1, 4
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2009summary/pdf/fy2009-bud-sum.pdf (noting
319 terrorism-related or anti-terrorism-case convictions or guilty pleas between September 11,
2001 and 2009).
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could be subject to either civilian or military confinement. Indeed, in some
cases, individuals were subjected to both forms of confinement.28 Unlike in
prior armed conflicts, where a person’s legal status as a combatant (i.e., a
prisoner of war) precluded his criminal prosecution except for war crimes, war
on terrorism detainees have no such protection from prosecution.29 The same
individual can be prosecuted in federal court for providing material support to
al Qaeda if the government elects the law enforcement model or be held
indefinitely in military custody as a member of al Qaeda if the government
opts instead for the law-of-war paradigm.30 That person, moreover, may also
be prosecuted in a military commission for providing material support to al
Qaeda.31
Jurisdictional overlap thus expanded the government’s options for holding
individuals based on a variety of terrorism-related conduct. It also offered
greater latitude to conduct interrogations and an escape from procedural
protections of the civilian criminal justice system, including access to counsel
and a prompt judicial hearing—protections that were denied to war-onterrorism detainees for years.32
Despite his post-inaugural order to close the U.S. detention center at
Guantánamo Bay,33 President Obama has maintained the underlying legal
framework that permits the military detention and prosecution of terrorism
suspects, pursuing a path of reform and legalization rather than returning to the
pre-9/11 exclusivity model of federal criminal prosecution.34 Early in his
administration, Obama stressed the need for flexibility and for maximizing the
government’s available counterterrorism tools.35 He stated that “whenever
feasible,” the Administration would seek to prosecute terrorism suspects in

28. Ali al-Marri, for example, was originally indicted in federal court, declared an enemy
combatant before his federal criminal trial, and then finally returned to the civilian system to face
different criminal charges after nearly six years of military detention. See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,
534 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring in part) (summarizing the underlying
facts), vacated, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
29. See HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 184–85.
30. As noted above, under a law-of-war model, the government could either hold a prisoner
indefinitely without charge as an enemy combatant or, where appropriate, prosecute that prisoner
for the commission of war crimes. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
31. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (Supp. III 2010).
32. See HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 75, 236.
33. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205 (2010).
34. See generally HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 238–52 (surveying the Obama Administration’s
detention policy, which “stressed the importance of the criminal justice system” in handling
terrorism cases, yet maintained the military commissions system and “continued to hold some
Guantánamo detainees indefinitely”).
35. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-OnNational-Security-5-21-09/.
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federal court.36 But he also endorsed prosecution in reformed military
commissions that provide greater protections to the accused and make
commissions a “more credible and effective means of administering justice”
than they were previously.37 Obama further accepted the legitimacy of holding
some individuals indefinitely in law-of-war detention—that is, without trial in
any forum—when prosecution was not possible because, for example, the
government’s evidence was tainted or insufficient to support a conviction.38
The Administration subsequently backed legislative reforms to military
commissions and provided a more nuanced statement of the President’s
detention authority under the AUMF, while eschewing claims of inherent
executive detention power under the Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief
Clause.39 Additionally, Obama halted two of the most controversial practices
associated with war-on-terrorism detentions, banning the use of “enhanced
interrogation techniques”40 and ordering the closure of any remaining secret
CIA “black sites.”41 These changes, along with Obama’s stated commitment
to a rights-respecting national security policy,42 helped diffuse criticism of
post-9/11 military detentions and legitimize the long-term incarceration of
terrorism suspects outside the criminal justice system.
While the executive branch has sought to maximize its options for
detaining terrorism suspects,43 Congress has sought to limit the President’s
ability to prosecute terrorism suspects in federal court, even where the
President determines that civilian court prosecution best serves the national
interest.
Congress has repeatedly attached provisions to military
appropriations legislation that prohibit the President from using any Defense
Department funds to transfer Guantánamo detainees to the United States for

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Administration, for example, replaced the label “enemy combatant” with
“unprivileged enemy belligerent,” relied expressly on the law of war, and required that a
prisoner’s support for al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated group be “substantial” to justify his
detention under the AUMF. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–75 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a
(Supp. III 2010)); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No.
08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (discussing the United States’ detention power of
Guantánamo detainees under the AUMF in light of law-of-war principles and emphasizing the
President’s intention to refine detention policies).
40. Exec. Order No. 13,491 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 199, 200–01 (2010) (confining the U.S.
government to the techniques set forth in the Army Field Manual).
41. Id. § 4(a).
42. See id. §§ 3–4; Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 33.
43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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any purpose, including for criminal prosecution in federal court.44 These
Article III-transfer bans have halted the further civilian court prosecution of
any Guantánamo detainees,45 including the planned prosecution of alleged 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) and four co-conspirators in
federal court in New York.46 Additionally, Congress has imposed restrictions
on the President’s ability to transfer Guantánamo detainees to other countries,
even where the President has determined that there is no basis or reason for the
United States to continue to hold them.47 Its restrictions have further
embedded the practice of indefinite detention at Guantánamo.
Recent legislation continues this pattern.
The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“2012 NDAA”) expressly codifies the
President’s authority to detain indefinitely individuals who were part of or who
substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force.48 The
2012 NDAA also requires the military detention of certain terrorism suspects.49
While the act allows the President to waive this requirement, it creates for the
first time a default presumption of military custody over terrorism suspects.50
The 2012 NDAA thus not only helps institutionalize indefinite military
detention as an alternative to federal criminal prosecution but also suggests
how military detention threatens to expand in new directions.
II. TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
Federal courts must now operate in the shadow of the alternative military
detention system that has emerged as part of the war on terrorism. That
system, in turn, has affected how federal courts are defined and perceived.
One effect has been to change the metric of success for federal courts, placing
emphasis on their ability to produce convictions and impose long sentences

44. E.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011).
45. See Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2011, at A1 (noting “stiffening Congressional resistance to bringing Guantánamo detainees into
the United States” prior to trying a former Guantánamo detainee in federal court). To date, only
one former Guantánamo detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, has been prosecuted in federal court.
See Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Jury Acquits Former Detainee of Most Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2010, at A1.
46. See Savage, supra note 45.
47. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 § 1033.
48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, § 1021,
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
49. Id. at § 1022 (creating a presumption of military custody for covered terrorism suspects).
The act excludes U.S. citizens from mandatory military detention. Id. at § 1022(b)(1).
50. Id. at § 1022(a). Congress had considered an even stronger mandatory detention
provision, which would have required a waiver from the Secretary of Defense. National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, S. 1867, 112th Cong. §§ 1031–32 (as passed by Senate,
Dec. 1, 2011).
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and minimizing other values, such as an institutional commitment to due
process and other constitutional norms.51 In an era where military detention
and prosecution remain options, the virtues of Article III-court prosecutions
rest increasingly on their toughness, rather than their fairness.
The overlap between federal criminal prosecution and military
confinement—whether through law-of-war detention or military commission
prosecution—has resulted in competition among law enforcement, military,
and intelligence agencies engaged in fighting terrorism. Given ongoing media
focus on U.S. counterterrorism efforts,52 that competition can be intense. The
decision whether to prosecute terrorism suspects in federal court or hold them
in some form of military confinement has important legal, political, and interagency ramifications. It is also laden with symbolic importance, pitting
competing visions of U.S. counterterrorism policy against one another.
Forum competition has surfaced prominently in the debate over the fate of
the remaining Guantánamo detainees. Obama’s post-inaugural executive order
directing the closure of the Guantánamo detention center created an interagency task force to review the status of the remaining 240 detainees there and
to provide recommendations for their proper disposition.53 One year later, the
task force issued its report, dividing the detainees into three broad categories:
those who would be prosecuted, those who would be subjected to continued
law-of-war detention, and those who would be transferred to a third country. 54
According to the report, thirty-six detainees had been referred for prosecution,
either in a federal court or a military commission.55 The prosecution category
included KSM and four other 9/11 co-conspirators who, as Attorney General
Eric Holder had previously announced, would be charged in federal district
court in New York.56 Another detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, had already

51. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text; see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra
note 10, at 1081 (“[T]he criminal justice system has diminished some traditional procedural
safeguards in terrorism trials and has quietly established the capacity for convicting terrorists
based on criteria that come close to associational status.”).
52. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15–22, 2010, at 52; Savage, supra note 45; Weiser, supra note
45.
53. Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 33, § 4.
54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 9–
10 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
55. Id. (noting that forty-four cases had initially been referred for prosecution and that thirtysix cases remained the subject of active referrals). The report also specified that 126 detainees
had been approved for transfer; forty-eight detainees had been approved for continued detention
under the AUMF; and thirty detainees from Yemen had been approved for “conditional”
detention based on security conditions in Yemen. Id.
56. See Charlie Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.
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been transferred from Guantánamo to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York for prosecution there based on his alleged involvement in
the 1998 Embassy bombings in East Africa.57 The task force report did not
indicate how many of the remaining detainees in the prosecution category
would be charged in federal court, as opposed to a military commission,
although Holder had also previously announced that six individuals connected
with the 2000 terrorist attack on the Navy destroyer Cole in Yemen would be
prosecuted in military commissions.58
The decision to prosecute even a few Guantánamo detainees in federal
court ignited a political backlash, with opposition crystallizing over the Justice
Department’s plan to try KSM in New York.59 Lawmakers, political-advocacy
groups, and conservative pundits all attacked Holder’s decision.60 According
to Andrew McCarthy, a former terrorism prosecutor and outspoken critic of
using federal courts to prosecute terrorism suspects, Holder failed to recognize
that in wartime the rule of law means using military commissions and not
“wrap[ping] our enemies in our Bill of Rights.”61 Opposition to KSM’s
prosecution gained momentum following the attempted 2009 Christmas Day
bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab of a Northwest Airlines plane bound
for Detroit.62 Critics charged that Abdulmutallab should be prosecuted before
a military commission and not treated as a criminal suspect, as Obama’s
Justice Department had done.63 “Why in God’s name would you stop
questioning a terrorist,” remarked former New York City mayor Rudolph
Giuliani in response to reports that Abdulmutallab had ceased cooperating after
invoking his Miranda rights during interrogations after his arrest.64 Senator
Lamar Alexander told FOX News that Holder should resign for failing to
distinguish “terrorists who are flying into Detroit, blowing up planes, and
American citizens who are committing a crime.”65
Before long, New York’s political leaders came out against prosecuting
KSM in New York, citing costs, security concerns, and local opposition.66
Congress, in turn, passed legislation barring the use of any military funds to
transfer Guantánamo detainees to the United States for any purpose, including

57. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial, WASH. POST, June 10,
2009, at A1.
58. Savage, supra note 56.
59. Id.; Mayer, supra note 52, at 52–53.
60. Mayer, supra note 52, at 52–53.
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id. at 52–53.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Mayer, supra note 52, at 54.
66. Id. at 53.
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for criminal trial.67 Faced with legal obstacles and mounting political pressure,
the Obama Administration reversed its decision to prosecute KSM and the 9/11
co-conspirators in federal court, stating that it would instead try the men in a
military commission.68 To date, Ghailani remains the only Guantánamo
detainee prosecuted in a U.S. federal court, and no other civilian court
prosecutions of Guantánamo detainees are expected.69
Each new arrest of a terrorism suspect, moreover, reignites the debate over
federal criminal prosecutions and sparks calls for military jurisdiction. When,
for example, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen, was arrested in
May 2010 for attempting to detonate a car bomb near New York City’s Times
Square, legislation was introduced in Congress that would have authorized the
State Department to strip American citizens suspected of supporting al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups of their citizenship, thereby permitting their
prosecution by military commission (since current law prohibits the
prosecution of American citizens by commission).70 The federal indictment of
Somali terrorism suspect Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame the following year—
after Warsame’s two-month detention on a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Aden—
prompted attacks against the Obama Administration for failing to prosecute
Warsame before a military commission.71 Bringing Warsame to trial in the
United States rather than sending him to Guantánamo, wrote Senators Joseph I.
Lieberman and Kelly Ayotte, undermined the government’s ability to obtain
intelligence, risked the disclosure of classified or other sensitive information,
In this narrative, military
and endangered the country’s security.72
commissions are associated with toughness and security, while federal courts
are portrayed as weak, incapable of handling classified or other sensitive
information, and overly protective of a defendant’s rights.73
Competition from military tribunals has placed pressure on federal courts
to demonstrate their ability to handle terrorism cases. Often, this pressure has
resulted in government officials and non-government organizations describing
67. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §
1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011).
68. Savage, supra note 45.
69. Ghailani Verdict Underlines Need for Fair Trials for All Guantánamo Detainees,
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/ghailani-verdictunderlines-need-fair-trials-all-guantánamo-detainees-2010-11-18 (“Ghailani, 36, is the first and
only Guantánamo detainee to be transferred to the US mainland for prosecution in a US civilian
court.”).
70. Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); Charlie Savage & Carl
Hulse, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’ Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A12.
71. See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A1.
72. Joseph I. Lieberman & Kelly Ayotte, Op-Ed., Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH.
POST, July 22, 2011, at A17.
73. Id.
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how effective federal courts are in obtaining convictions and negating the
charge that federal prosecutions sacrifice security in the name of due process
and fairness.74
In defending his initial decision to prosecute the 9/11 conspirators in
federal court rather than in a military commission, for example, Holder cited
federal courts’ success in convicting terrorism suspects in the past, their ability
to handle classified material, and their power to impose the severest sanctions,
including death.75 Not surprisingly, Holder did not mention the rights afforded
all defendants, including those accused of the gravest crimes.76 Holder echoed
similar themes in his statement after the decision to prosecute the 9/11
conspirators in federal court was ultimately reversed.77 Holder explained that
he had chosen a federal forum because it could “achieve swift and sure justice
most effectively for the victims of [the 9/11 attacks] and their family
members.”78 He criticized congressional restrictions on using federal courts to
prosecute Guantánamo detainees because the restrictions undermined
America’s counterterrorism efforts and threatened its security by taking “one
of the nation’s most tested counterterrorism tools off the table” and tying the
Administration’s “hands in a way that could have serious ramifications.”79
While Holder emphasized that federal courts have provided an “unparalleled
instrument for bringing terrorists to justice,” he once again declined to defend
federal courts based on the protections they offer the accused or the
mechanisms they provide to ensure a fair trial.80
Others have defended federal courts on similar grounds. Former judges,
prosecutors, and other government officials have filed amicus curiae briefs in
post-9/11 cases that detail the success of federal courts in convicting terrorism
suspects.81 Bar associations have made similar points.82 Even liberal

74. See supra notes 11–12, 51 and accompanying text.
75. See Mayer, supra note 52, at 54.
76. See id.
77. See Press Release, Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Statement of the Attorney
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Former Federal Judges & Former Senior Justice
Department Officials in Support of Petitioner at 6, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)
(No. 08-368), 2009 WL 230957 at *6 (emphasizing the federal courts’ success in obtaining
convictions in terrorism cases, history of imposing lengthy sentences, and ability to handle
classified and other sensitive information).
82. See Letter from Samuel W. Seymor, President, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Hon. Harry R.
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, & Hon. Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate 1–2
(Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072081-Letterto
CongressregardingSections1112and1113ofthe2011Full-YearContinuingAppropriationsAct.pdf
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advocacy groups have emphasized the toughness of federal courts in
prosecuting terrorism suspects. In a full-page advertisement in the New York
Times, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union stressed the federal
court system’s success in handling terrorism cases, along with noting the due
process protections it affords the accused.83 Meanwhile, military commissions
have themselves sought to appropriate notions of fairness and justice
traditionally associated with federal courts to enhance their legitimacy as a
forum for terrorism prosecutions.84
Defenses of federal prosecutions thus rest increasingly on their efficacy in
securing convictions and promoting national security. The protections
afforded criminal suspects, by contrast, have become a liability that federal
courts must overcome rather than an independent virtue to be emphasized. To
the extent rights are mentioned at all, they are typically referenced in terms of
their ability to provide legitimacy to the process and thus support for the
conviction, rather than as safeguards of the accused.85
The emphasis on prosecutorial prowess and success is understandable. In
light of the highly charged political climate surrounding terrorism, stressing
federal courts’ ability to prosecute terrorism cases can help deflect arguments
for military commissions or indefinite detention. Framing the argument for a
civilian criminal trial of the 9/11 conspirators in terms of the rights it affords
defendants might have been counter-productive, in addition to exacting a
heavy political price on those who voiced it. Highlighting federal courts’
toughness also facilitates seemingly unlikely alliances—for example, between
liberal advocacy groups and law enforcement officials—who may oppose the
use of military tribunals for different reasons.
Equating the validity of federal courts with their ability to obtain
convictions does, however, have costs. It contributes to a larger narrative in
which any result except a guilty verdict represents a failure of the system. In
other words, the potential for acquittal, when the metric is toughness and not
(emphasizing the ability of federal courts to obtain convictions in opposing a proposed expansion
of military commissions and military detention authority). Disclosure: the author is a member of
the group that participated in drafting this letter. The views and opinions expressed in this Article
are the author’s own.
83. See Stephanie Woodrow, ACLU Calls on Obama to Support Holder on Civilian Trials,
MAIN JUST. (Mar. 8. 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/08/aclu-calls-on-obama-to-sup
port-holder-on-civil-trials/.
84. The website for the military commissions, for example, describes the commissions’
mission as “provid[ing] fair and transparent trials of those persons subject to trial by Military
Commissions while protecting national security interests.” See OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS,
http://www.mc.mil/HOME.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
85. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel W. Seymor, supra note 82, at 2 (describing the
effectiveness of federal courts in handling terrorism cases while still preserving due process
protections); Woodrow, supra note 83 (emphasizing the ability of federal courts to handle
terrorism cases while still allowing for due process, leading to greater credibility to the trial).
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fairness, becomes a politically and socially unacceptable outcome that
undermines the case for federal courts. Indeed, the outcome need not even be
an outright acquittal.
The Ghailani case86 illustrates this problem. In June 2009, after nearly five
years of enemy combatant detention—first at a secret CIA “black site” and
then at Guantánamo—Ghailani was transferred to the United States for federal
criminal prosecution.87 Ghailani was indicted on more than 280 counts of
murder and conspiracy for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East
Africa that killed 224 people and injured thousands.88 As the first—and still
only—criminal prosecution of a former Guantánamo detainee,89 the Ghailani
trial was laden with symbolism, a “test case” for the viability of federal
prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees and others held as enemy
combatants. After five days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict
convicting Ghailani on a single count of conspiracy to destroy government
property and buildings and acquitting him of all other charges.90 Critics of
civilian court prosecutions seized on the verdict as an example of the risks
federal trials pose. Representative Peter King of New York (Republican), for
example, called the verdict “a tragic wake-up call to the Obama
[A]dministration to immediately abandon its ill-advised plan to try
Guantánamo terrorists” in federal civilian courts and an example of why the
United States “must treat [the detainees] as wartime enemies and try them in
military commissions at Guantánamo.”91 Senator Mitch McConnell of
Kentucky (Republican) questioned why the United States would “even take the
chance” of trying Ghailani in a civilian court, where he might be acquitted.92
The Justice Department responded that the conviction showed the federal court
system worked because Ghailani was convicted and would receive a lengthy
sentence, despite the complications his case posed—complications, it noted,
that were the result of Ghailani’s prior mistreatment in secret CIA detention.93

86. United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
87. Weiser, supra note 45.
88. See Office of Pub. Affairs, Ahmed Ghailani Transferred from Guantanamo Bay to New
York for Prosecution on Terror Charges, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 9, 2009), http://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-563.html; see also Weiser, supra note 45.
89. Weiser, supra note 45; Ghailani Verdict Underlines Need for Fair Trials for All
Guantánamo Detainees, supra note 69.
90. Weiser, supra note 45.
91. Charlie Savage, Ghailani Verdict Reignites Debate Over the Proper Court for Terrorism
Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A18.
92. See Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the
Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 774 (2011)
(quoting Sen. McConnell’s statement).
93. See Peter Finn, Embassy Bomber Receives Life Sentence, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2011, at
A2; Weiser, supra note 45.
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(Ghailani ultimately received a life sentence).94 Some journalists and
advocates, to be sure, pointed out that the success of federal courts should be
measured in terms of their ability to provide fair trials, which, by necessity,
must include the possibility of acquittal.95 But it was the perception of federal
courts as posing an unacceptable risk of acquittal that dominated the public
discourse.
Even the district judge who presided over Ghailani’s case sought to dispel
any concerns that a federal trial could result in Ghailani’s release. Before trial,
District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan had barred a key government witness from
testifying on the ground that admission of the testimony would violate
Ghailani’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the
government had obtained the witness’s testimony through its coercive
interrogation of Ghailani in secret CIA detention.96 In his order suppressing
the witness’s statements, Kaplan emphasized the need to preserve the integrity
of the federal courts by upholding constitutional protections.97 “[T]he
Constitution is the rock upon which our nation rests,” he explained. “We must
follow it not only when it is convenient, but when fear and danger beckon in a
different direction.”98 Yet, Kaplan also sought to assuage any fear that his
ruling could result in the defendant’s release: even if Ghailani were acquitted
at trial, he said, the United States could still “probably” detain him as an
enemy combatant.99
Courts, Resnik and Curtis observe in Representing Justice, have long
provided a way for the government “to legitimate its own use of force against
the disobedient by demonstrating that those who have breached [its] law[s] are
identified and sanctioned after being found responsible.”100 Yet, that

94. Finn, supra note 93.
95. E.g., Amy Davidson, The Ghailani Verdict, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2010/11/the-ghailani-verdict.html (“Our legal
system is not a machine for producing the maximum number of convictions, regardless of the
law.”); Charlie Savage, Terror Verdict Tests Obama’s Strategy on Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/nyregion/19detainees.html (quoting Mason Clutter of
the Constitution Project) (“I don’t think we judge success based on the number of convictions that
were received. I think we judge success based on fair prosecutions consistent with the
Constitution and the rule of law.”).
96. United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
witness, Hussein Abebe, would have testified that he had sold Ghailani explosives prior to the
bombing. Id. at 279.
97. United States v. Ghailani, No. S10 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 4006381, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010).
98. Id.
99. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 288. In addition, Kaplan noted, a military commission
would likely have excluded the testimony, thus neutralizing any disadvantage of prosecuting him
in an Article III forum. Id. at 287 n.182.
100. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 13.
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legitimacy also depends on the proposition that courts will provide evenhanded justice, including to those accused of the most serious crimes. In a
prior generation, some maintained that federal courts were superior to other
forums (namely, state courts) because of their ability and willingness to
enforce constitutional protections.101 Yet, the development of an alternative,
military system for incarcerating terrorism suspects, along with the highly
charged political climate on national security matters, has both helped make
protecting rights a liability and tethered the continued legitimacy of federal
courts to their ability to deliver a specific outcome.
A related consequence of the forum competition created by military
detention is the pressure it places on courts to limit rights within the confines
of the federal prosecution itself. Again, the Ghailani case is instructive.
Following his transfer from Guantánamo to the United States, Ghailani moved
to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it violated his speedy trial rights
under the Sixth Amendment.102 An indictment against Ghailani had been
pending in the Southern District of New York since 1998.103 But rather than
being brought to the United States to stand trial after his seizure in 2004,
Ghailani was taken first to a CIA “black site,” where he was held for two
years, and then to Guantánamo, where he was detained for nearly three more
years.104 The district court nevertheless rejected Ghailani’s speedy trial
argument under the functional analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo.105 Judge
Kaplan found that Ghailani was not prejudiced by the delay because the
purpose of his prior war on terrorism detention was “to gather intelligence, not
evidence for use in [his] criminal case.”106 Further, Kaplan said, the alleged
abuse Ghailani suffered during CIA and military interrogations did not require
pretrial incarceration that would not have otherwise have occurred since
Ghailani would have been held as an enemy combatant even if there had been
no indictment pending against him.107 While the court questioned the
government’s decision to detain Ghailani at Guantánamo rather than bring him
to the United States for trial, it found that Ghailani’s initial detention at a CIA
“black site” had the valid purpose of gathering information through

101. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977)
(describing the superiority of federal courts compared to state courts for constitutional cases).
102. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
103. Id. at 521 (describing the indictment against Ghailani and others for their participation in
the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam).
104. Id. at 522–26 (describing Ghailani’s detention in CIA custody and at Guantánamo).
105. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (examining the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant”); see also Ghailani, 751 F.
Supp. 2d at 528–40 (applying the Barker factors to the case).
106. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
107. Id.
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interrogations.108 The district court’s ruling thus underscored how enemy
combatant detentions—both as a means of gathering intelligence and
incapacitating terrorism suspects—can limit constitutional protections, such as
the guarantee of a speedy trial.109
War on terrorism detentions have created pressure to relax other
constitutional protections, such as the Miranda requirement, which restricts the
government’s ability to use as evidence statements made during custodial
interrogations.110 Critics of using federal courts to prosecute terrorism suspects
argue that Miranda impedes the government’s ability to gather intelligence and
neutralize security threats.111 The attempted terrorist attacks by Abdulmutallab
and Shahzad reignited the controversy over Miranda, with critics arguing that
providing Miranda warnings to recently arrested terrorism suspects impedes
the government’s ability to gain useful intelligence.112 Abdulmutallab and
Shahzad were questioned for nearly one hour and three hours, respectively,
before Miranda warnings were provided.113 In other cases, the administration
relied on Miranda’s “public safety exception,” which permits law enforcement
officers to delay issuing Miranda warnings where the officers need to obtain
information quickly to prevent further crimes.114 Republican lawmakers
nevertheless criticized the Obama Administration for treating Abdulmutallab
and Shahzad as criminal suspects rather than as military prisoners, as doing the
latter would have permitted the government to continue the interrogations, free
of any Miranda requirement.115 The Administration defended its decision to
treat the suspects as criminal detainees, noting that both men provided valuable

108. Id. at 540.
109. See id. at 540–41.
110. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (generally forbidding prosecutors
from using as evidence statements made by suspects in custody before they have been warned
that they have the right to remain silent and to legal counsel).
111. See, e.g., M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and
the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 631, 648 (2007); Rick Pildes, Should Congress Codify the
Public-Safety Exception to Miranda for Terrorism Cases?, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2010, 9:00
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/05/should-congress-codify-public-safety.html.
But cf.
Ryan T. Williams, Stop Taking the Bait: Diluting the Miranda Doctrine Does Not Make America
Safer from Terrorism, 56 LOY. L. REV. 907 (2010) (arguing that the dilution of Miranda does not
improve national security).
112. Amos N. Guiora, Relearning the Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism, 71
LA. L. REV. 1147, 1147–49 (2011) (discussing the arguments against providing terrorism suspects
such as Abdulmutallab and Shahzad with Miranda warnings).
113. See Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2010, at A1.
114. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (describing the “public safety”
exception).
115. Savage, supra note 113.
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intelligence.116 The Administration also said, however, that it would consider
backing legislation to give officials greater leeway to interrogate terrorism
suspects as part of a law enforcement investigation.117
Thus far, the Obama Administration has not pressed for legislation to limit
Miranda. It has, however, issued a policy guidance that seeks to give FBI
agents greater latitude in determining whether, and when, to provide Miranda
warnings in certain terrorism cases.118 The guidance provides a more flexible
interpretation of Miranda’s public safety exception, which allows the
admission of unwarned statements obtained from questioning that is intended
to prevent some immediate harm to the officers or the public safety rather than
to elicit testimonial evidence.119 The Supreme Court has held that the
exception applies to an alleged assailant’s unwarned statements to police
officers about the location of a gun in a supermarket after the officers noticed
the assailant’s holster was empty.120 The Obama Administration’s FBI
guidance argues that the magnitude and complexity of the threat posed by
terrorist organizations requires a more flexible interpretation of exigency than
ordinary crime—that is, a broader conception of what questioning may be
“reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”121 The FBI memo
thus explains that the public safety exception could extend to the questioning
of “operational terrorist” suspects about “possible impending or coordinated
terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and threat posed by weapons that might
post an imminent danger to the public; and the identities, locations, and
activities or intentions of accomplices who may be plotting additional
imminent attacks.”122 Additionally, the guidance acknowledges that there may
be situations where the need to collect “valuable and timely intelligence not

116. See id.
117. Anne E. Kornblut, Should Terrorists Have Rights to Remain Silent?, WASH. POST., May
10, 2010, at A10.
118. See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, on Custodial
Interrogation for Public Safety and Intelligence-Gathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists
Inside the United States (Oct. 21, 2010), reprinted in F.B.I. Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html [hereinafter FBI Miranda
Guidance]; Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2011, at A17.
119. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657; FBI Miranda Guidance, supra note 118; Savage, supra note
118.
120. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
121. Id. at 656; FBI Miranda Guidance, supra note 118; Savage, supra note 118.
122. FBI Miranda Guidance, supra note 118. The Guidance defines an “operational terrorist”
as “an arrestee who is reasonably believed to be either a high-level member of an international
terrorist group; or an operative who has personally conducted or attempted to conduct a terrorist
operation that involved risk to life; or an individual knowledgeable about operational details of a
pending terrorist operation.” Id.
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related to any immediate threat” warrants continued unwarned questioning,
even at the cost of the statements being inadmissible.123
While the FBI guidance’s effect on law enforcement investigations
remains uncertain, it underscores how the development of an alternative
system of military detention can help lead to limitations on individual rights
within the existing law enforcement paradigm. The prospect of law-of-war
detention or military commission prosecution—unencumbered by any Miranda
requirement—places added pressure on the civilian justice system to
accommodate government demands for increased flexibility in detaining and
questioning terrorism suspects. Additionally, it gives policymakers greater
confidence in staking out aggressive positions—even to the point of expressly
authorizing unwarned interrogations outside Miranda’s public safety
exception—because they know that there remains an alternative to criminal
justice detention should prosecution become infeasible due to the
inadmissibility of statements obtained in violation of Miranda.124
Forum competition from military tribunals has also helped mute criticism
of the government’s broad interpretation of and increased reliance on material
support statutes to prosecute terrorism suspects for supporting or assisting
terrorism or designated terrorist organizations.125 In Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project,126 the Supreme Court upheld the government’s authority to
prosecute two groups of Americans for providing assistance to nongovernment
organizations that had been designated foreign terrorist organizations in those
organizations’ efforts to seek peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and
obtain humanitarian assistance.127 While individuals remained free to speak

123. Id.; Savage, supra note 118.
124. Cf. David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 1, 73–74 (2011) (noting that interrogating terrorism suspects without Miranda
warnings may have a slightly higher chance of producing intelligence, but “only Mirandized
interrogation offers an enhanced ability to neutralize the terrorist by using his statements to
support his long-term detention through the criminal justice system”).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (prohibiting the provision of material support to
terrorists); id. § 2339B (prohibiting the provision of material support to foreign terrorist
organizations). Material support is defined to include such activities as “training,” providing
“personnel,” and giving “expert advice or assistance.” Id. § 2339A(b)(1). For a discussion of the
government’s increasing reliance on the material-support statutes in federal terrorism
investigations and prosecutions, see, for example, Kris, supra note 124, at 14 n.47, 17 nn.50–51
(collecting cases). See also id. at 7 n.29 (discussing expansion of the material-support statutes
after 9/11).
126. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
127. Id. at 2729–30. One group of Americans seeking to invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 2339B in
Holder had tried to assist a separatist Kurdish organization by training it to use international law
and the United Nations for peaceful dispute resolution; the other group in Holder had sought to
assist a separatist organization in Sri Lanka by training it to apply for humanitarian aid. Id. at
2713, 2716.
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out on any topic they wished, the Court said, they could be criminally
prosecuted for providing material support to terrorism, consistent with the First
Amendment, if the speech was done in concert with a foreign terrorist
organization and imparted “specialized knowledge” or a “specific skill” to that
organization.128 The Court thus upheld material-support prosecutions even
where the speech itself did not advocate terrorism and where the government
had not provided evidence that the speech would actually increase terrorist
activity.129 Yet, while civil liberties groups criticized the Court’s decision in
Holder for “criminalizing [protected] speech meant to promote peace and
human rights,”130 those groups have also cited the material support statutes in
defending the use of Article III courts over military tribunals because of the
broad powers it gives law enforcement to incapacitate terrorism suspects even
before any terrorist act is even committed.131
Another effect of this alternative system of military detention is the
incentive it creates to channel weaker cases away from federal court and
towards military jurisdiction. The Obama Administration’s Task Force
recommended a federal prosecution of the 9/11 conspirators not only because
of the severity of the crime, but also because of its confidence that federal
prosecutors could obtain a conviction.132 By contrast, where the Task Force
was less confident about a conviction for evidentiary, procedural, or other
reasons, but was still opposed to the detainee’s transfer to another country, it
recommended indefinite law-of-war detention under the AUMF.133
Paradoxically, therefore, it is the weaker cases—those in which the federal
criminal justice system’s protections matter most to the accused—that will
most likely be channeled towards military detention because that forum’s rules
so heavily favor the government.

128. Id. at 2722–24.
129. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2011); see
also Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89
TEX. L. REV. 833, 893 (2011) (explaining that Holder “reduce[s] constitutional protection against
guilt by association in a class of cases defined by the government to a token ban on membership
proscription that government can easily circumvent”).
130. See, e.g., Supreme Court Rules “Material Support” Law Can Stand, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (June 21, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rulesmaterial-support-law-can-stand (quoting former President Jimmy Carter).
131. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 31–38 (2008),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuitjustice.pdf; Fact Sheet: Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf, 1 (last
modified Mar. 1, 2012).
132. FINAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 19–21.
133. Id. at 23–24.
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III. CIVIL REMEDIES AND THE VANISHING FEDERAL FORUM
Civil litigation by individuals seeking redress for torture and other abuses
surfaces similar debates about the viability of federal courts as a forum for
terrorism cases. Federal courts have repeatedly dismissed actions by
noncitizens against U.S. officials seeking damages for arbitrary detention,
torture, and other mistreatment.134 The dismissals, which rest on various
grounds, including the “state secrets” privilege, Bivens’s “special factors,” and
qualified immunity, typically cite the twin concerns of separation of powers
and limited judicial capacity as reasons for denying litigants a federal forum.135
The decisions portray federal courts as unable to provide remedies for even the
most egregious rights violations. That some judges have been willing to
exercise jurisdiction over the relatively few civil damages actions brought by
U.S. citizens136 only highlights the degree to which broader criticisms of
federal court review in this area have gained acceptance, including among
federal judges themselves.
Suits brought by individuals in connection with the CIA’s “extraordinary
rendition” program137 have foundered on state secrets grounds. In El-Masri v.
United States, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of a
lawsuit filed by Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was seized while
traveling in Macedonia and rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan, where he was
secretly detained and tortured.138 Similarly, in Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc.,139 a narrowly divided Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the
dismissal on state secrets grounds of an action brought by five individuals who
had been subjected to the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.140 The
plaintiffs in that case had sued Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation, for

134. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565, 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by a dual citizen of Syria and Canada against
federal officials seeking damages for harms suffered as a result of his detention, confinement, and
interrogation); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by four British nationals against Donald Rumsfeld and
military officials seeking damages for illegal detainment and mistreatment); El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint brought by a German citizen against George Tenet and other CIA employees seeking
damages for being held against his will and other mistreatment suffered during his detention).
135. See infra notes 142–93 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text.
137. The CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” program is defined as “the clandestine abduction
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities,
and their subsequent interrogation using methods impermissible under U.S. and international
laws.” El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300.
138. Id. at 300, 313.
139. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1073–75.
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its role in transporting them among various locations where they were secretly
detained and tortured by the CIA.141
In El-Masri and Jeppesen, the appeals courts dismissed the lawsuits under
the state secrets privilege,142 as recognized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Reynolds.143 Their application of the privilege rested on two
overarching factors: the separation of powers concerns that would be raised by
judicial review of the plaintiffs’ allegations144 and the limited institutional
capacity of the judiciary in matters affecting national security and sensitive
foreign policy questions.145 As to the separation of powers, the Fourth Circuit
in El-Masri determined that because the state secrets privilege has a
constitutional basis, it limits judicial interference with military and foreign
affairs matters committed to the executive branch.146 Thus, the court
suggested, allowing a suit challenging a secret CIA detention and interrogation
program to proceed could bring the judiciary into constitutional conflict with
the executive.147 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Jeppesen similarly
underscored the need for judicial deference to the executive on matters of
foreign policy and national security.148
Questions about the institutional competency of courts weighed heavily in
both cases. El-Masri emphasized the superiority of executive and intelligence
agencies in evaluating the consequences of relying on sensitive government
information.149 “[G]iven the sophisticated nature of modern intelligence
analysis,” the court explained, judges lack the ability to determine how one
seemingly innocuous item of information might be of great significance when

141. Id. at 1075.
142. Id. at 1093; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313.
143. 345 U.S. 1, 6–7, 10 (1953). Under Reynolds, a court must honor the executive’s
assertion of the privilege if it determines that the privilege is valid and that “from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.” Id. at
10.
144. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303.
145. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305.
146. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303 (“Although the state secrets privilege was developed at
common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the executive
branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs
responsibilities.”).
147. See id. (“[T]he state secrets doctrine allow[s] the Court to avoid the constitutional
conflict that might have arisen had the judiciary demanded that the Executive disclose highly
sensitive military secrets.”).
148. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1081–82 (quoting Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507
F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“[W]e acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on
matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves
second guessing the Executive in this arena.”).
149. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305.
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viewed in its proper context.150 Similarly, the court suggested that judges
cannot properly assess the risk of diplomatic fall-out resulting from the failure
to protect sensitive information from disclosure.151
In Jeppesen, the original appellate panel had reversed the district court’s
decision dismissing the suit on state secrets grounds.152 In his dissent from the
en banc opinion, Judge Hawkins, the author of the Ninth Circuit panel
decision,153 explained that the state secrets privilege extends only to evidence,
and not to facts, and thus cannot be used “to prevent a litigant from persuading
a jury of the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to non-privileged
evidence,” even if the privileged evidence “might also be probative of the truth
or falsity of the allegation.”154 The Reynolds privilege, Hawkins reasoned,
must be asserted by the government with respect to specific pieces of evidence
and on an item-by-item basis, rather than through its wholesale application to
the plaintiffs’ allegations.155 Although Hawkins recognized that some
evidence in Jeppesen might be subject to the state secrets privilege, the
plaintiffs must still have the opportunity to establish their claims with nonprivileged evidence,156 including the evidence about the extraordinary
rendition program and Jeppesen’s role in it, that was already in the public
domain and thus not protected by the privilege.157
The en banc court rejected this more limited interpretation of the state
secrets privilege.158 It assumed that the plaintiffs’ prima facie case and

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 951–52, 962 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g
en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009).
153. See id., 579 F.3d at 949.
154. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1099 n.13. A separate form of the state secrets privilege bars suit where the entire
subject of the litigation is a state secret. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–07 (1875)
(dismissing suit by a spy for alleged breach of an agreement with the government to compensate
him for his wartime espionage services); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (relying on
Totten in dismissing claims by two former Cold War spies who accused the CIA of reneging on a
commitment to provide financial support in exchange for their espionage services). The en banc
court in Jeppesen rested its decision on the narrower Reynolds bar. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1085
(majority opinion) (declining to decide whether the suit was barred under Totten because the
Reynolds bar applied).
156. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1100–01 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 1095 & n.2 (stating that the plaintiffs in Jeppesen submitted more than 1,800
pages of documents regarding the extraordinary rendition program, which were in the public
record and were summarized as an Appendix to the dissent).
158. See id. at 1087 (majority opinion) (holding that dismissal is required even if it is
assumed that the plaintiffs could prove their case with non-privileged evidence).
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Jeppesen’s defenses might not necessarily depend on privileged evidence.159 It
concluded, however, that it would be too difficult for a court to separate
privileged from non-privileged evidence or to manage properly the risks of
unintended disclosure of sensitive information.160 More specifically, the court
concluded that, because the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims were “so
infused with [state] secrets, any plausible effort by Jeppesen to defend against
them would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing [those] secrets.”161 The
appeals court thus affirmed the district court’s pleading-stage dismissal, even
though it recognized that the result left the plaintiffs without the possibility of a
judicial remedy for allegedly egregious violations of their rights.162
Similar perceptions about limited judicial competency on matters
implicating national security and foreign policy have led to Rule 12 dismissals
of Bivens claims seeking redress from arbitrary detention and torture. In its
1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, the Supreme Court established that individuals may obtain a
judicially created damages remedy for constitutional torts committed by
federal officials.163 The Court noted, however, that a judicial remedy might
not be appropriate when “special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress.”164 The Supreme Court has previously found
that special factors preclude a Bivens remedy when Congress has created a
comprehensive remedial scheme,165 when the suit would interfere with the
military’s internal disciplinary structure,166 or when defining a workable cause
of action proves too difficult.167 In Arar v. Ashcroft, however, the Second
Circuit expanded this exception in concluding that national security itself could

159. Id. The en banc panel also assumed, without deciding, that the Totten bar did not apply.
Id. at 1085.
160. Id. at 1088.
161. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1088.
162. Id. at 1089, 1091–93.
163. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395
(1971).
164. Id. at 396.
165. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423–24, 429 (1988) (dismissing due to Congress’s
creation of a comprehensive remedial scheme for Social Security benefits).
166. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297, 304–05 (1983) (dismissing a suit by enlisted
men against superior officers for racial discrimination in duty assignments and performance
evaluations).
167. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 543, 562, 567–68 (2007) (dismissing a suit by a
landowner against federal officials, who allegedly interfered with the landowner’s exercise of
property rights through harassment and intimidation because creating “a new Bivens remedy to
redress such injuries collectively . . . raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of
action”).
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constitute a special factor that warrants dismissal in the absence of express
congressional action creating a damages remedy.168
Arar’s complaint alleged that U.S. government agents, including high-level
Justice Department officials, conspired to render him from the United States to
Syria, where he was detained incommunicado for nearly a year and tortured.169
In a divided decision, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the district
court’s dismissal of Arar’s Bivens claims against the officials based on special
factors.170 Like El-Masri and Jeppesen, Arar framed concerns about judicial
involvement in terms of both constitutional separation of powers and
institutional capacity. In particular, the Second Circuit underscored the
problems a federal court would face in managing the litigation without
jeopardizing national security or harming the country’s foreign relations.171
Those problems included the presence of classified and other sensitive
information,172 the risk of intruding on the sensitive area of diplomatic
communications surrounding prisoner transfers,173 and the risk of “graymail,”
as the government would face pressure to settle the case on terms favorable to
the plaintiff merely to avoid intrusive discovery or to prevent sensitive
information from becoming public.174 Although the challenges presented by
classified and other sensitive information are not unique to extraordinary
rendition, the panel questioned whether judges could handle those challenges
in the context of national security.175 It concluded that judges should not
entertain suits for the harms caused by extraordinary rendition absent
legislation by Congress expressly providing for a civil damages remedy, as
Congress “alone has the institutional competence to set parameters, delineate
safe harbors, and specify relief.”176 Indeed, the court said, judges lacked
competence not merely to decide the various evidentiary and case management
issues raised by the suit, but also to identify the line between constitutional and
unconstitutional conduct.177 It thus contrasted suits against government
officials for extraordinary rendition with those against prison guards for

168. 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
169. Id. at 566.
170. Id. at 574, 582.
171. Id. at 574.
172. Id. at 576–77.
173. Arar, 585 F.3d at 578.
174. Id. at 578–79.
175. See id. at 575–76 (stating that courts “have long been hesitant to intrude” on “matters
touching upon foreign policy and national security” and noting that in order to probe the basis of
the plaintiff’s designation as a terrorist and his removal to Syria, the district court would have to
consider the actions of the national security apparatus of at least three foreign countries plus the
United States).
176. Id. at 564.
177. Id. at 580.
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beating an inmate or against agents for executing a warrantless search,
explaining “that the context of extraordinary rendition is so different, involving
as it does a complex and rapidly changing legal framework beset with critical
legal judgments that have not yet been made, as well as policy choices that are
by no means easily reached.”178
The D.C. Circuit applied a similar logic in dismissing damages suits
against high-ranking government officials by individuals previously held in
military custody. In Rasul v. Myers, the court identified “[t]he danger of
obstructing U.S. national security policy” as a basis for dismissing a Bivens
suit brought by four former detainees who claimed they had been tortured and
abused at Guantánamo.179 Additionally, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the court held that
special factors precluded a Bivens remedy for individuals previously
imprisoned in Iraq and Afghanistan.180 Civil damages litigation, the court
explained, would hinder U.S. armed forces and disrupt the war effort.181
Although not decided on Bivens special factors or state secrets grounds, the
Supreme Court’s five-Justice majority decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal adopts a
similar view of the limitations of federal courts in adjudicating challenges to
illegal government conduct in the national security context.182 In the months
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government arrested and detained
approximately 762 individuals on immigration charges, a number of whom
were designated “high interest” detainees and were held under highly
“restrictive conditions designed to prevent them from communicating with the
general prison population or the outside world.”183 One of those detainees,
Javier Iqbal, brought suit under Bivens against various federal officials,
including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller, for their role in his detention and treatment.184 Iqbal, a Muslim from

178. Arar, 585 F.3d at 580.
179. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528, 532 n.5, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the court
dismissed the Bivens claims on qualified immunity grounds, it identified special factors as an
alternative basis for dismissal of the claims. Id. at 532 & n.5; see also Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld,
684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying on Rasul v. Myers in dismissing a wrongful
death action by families of two former Guantánamo detainees who died in U.S. custody at the
Guantanamo prison on, inter alia, Bivens special factors grounds), aff’d on other grounds, AlZahrani v. Rodriguez, No. 10-5393, 2012 WL 539370 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that
habeas corpus statute amendments deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over the action).
180. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 764, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
181. Id. at 773–74.
182. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009) (rejecting the “careful-casemanagement approach,” which permits limited discovery against high-ranking government
officials to determine whether a misconduct claim should proceed, and finding that there are
“serious and legitimate reasons” to preserve, as much as possible, those officials’ qualified
immunity, especially during this “unprecedented” security emergency).
183. Id. at 1943.
184. Id. at 1943–44.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

RECONCEPTUALIZING FEDERAL COURTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR

1081

Pakistan, contended that Ashcroft and Mueller violated his rights by labeling
him a “high interest” detainee and causing him to endure abusive treatment on
account of his race, religion, and/or national origin.185 The Supreme Court
held that the claims against Ashcroft and Mueller should be dismissed because
Iqbal had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish their plausibility and that
other explanations were equally plausible—namely, that “a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their
suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on
Arab Muslims” since “[t]he September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers”186 and that Iqbal and others were labeled “high interest”
detainees not because of their race, religion, or national origin but because the
government “sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”187
Iqbal suggests the Court’s resistance to allowing civil damages litigation
based on decisions made by government officials in the counterterrorism
context, especially where that litigation seeks to hold high-level government
officials liable.188 The Court, to be sure, did not condone Iqbal’s physical and
emotional abuse in detention, nor did it seek to prevent Iqbal’s Bivens claims
against individual prison guards from going forward.189 Still, it barred any
challenge to the government’s broader arrest and detention policies in the

185. Id. at 1942, 1944. Iqbal alleged, for example, that his jailors “‘kicked him in the
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell without justification,
subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or
others, and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be ‘[n]o prayers for
terrorists.’” Id. at 1944 (internal citations omitted).
186. Id. at 1950–52. The Court’s language seems to suggest mistakenly that all Muslims are
Arabs. Iqbal himself, for example, was not; he was a Muslim from Pakistan. Id. at 1942.
187. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952. In April of 2002, Iqbal pleaded guilty to federal criminal
charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud with identification. Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143, 148 n.1, 149 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). He was deported to
Pakistan following his release from prison. Id. at 149.
188. The Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), demonstrates a
similar pattern. There, a U.S. citizen sued then-Attorney General John Ashcroft for pretextual use
of the material witness statute to detain him where the government lacked sufficient evidence to
charge him criminally. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. The Court unanimously reversed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
2085 (holding that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity whether or not his conduct was
lawful). The Court further held (by a 5-3 majority) that Ashcroft’s conduct could not have
violated the Fourth Amendment because an arrest made under a validly obtained material witness
warrant is lawful regardless of a government official’s subjective intent. Id. at 2083 & n.3.
189. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (“[Plaintiff’s] account of his prison ordeal alleges serious
official misconduct that we need not address here.”); see also id. at 1942 (“[Plaintiff’s] account of
his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some
governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these actors are not before
us here.”).
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aftermath of 9/11 and any judicial inquiry into the role high-level officials like
Ashcroft and Mueller played in formulating those policies.190 Such litigation,
the Court said, exacts “heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of
valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper
execution of the work of the Government.”191 According to the Court, those
costs not only outweigh any benefit gained in ensuring that officials comply
with the law, but also are magnified in the national security context,
particularly when high-level government officials must respond to “a national
and international security emergency” like 9/11.192 The Court thus rejected
Iqbal’s suggestion that careful case management provided a way for judges to
minimize the costs of civil damages litigation in allowing litigation to proceed
beyond the pleading stage and deferring decision on an official’s qualified
immunity defense until summary judgment and after an opportunity for
discovery.193
Federal courts have also dismissed civil damages actions against civilian
contractors for alleged torture and other abuses. In Saleh v. Titan Corp., Iraqi
nationals brought suit against two private military contractors that provided
military services to the U.S. government at the Abu Ghraib military prison in
Iraq,194 alleging that they were beaten, electrocuted, raped, and subjected to
attacks by dogs.195 A divided D.C. Circuit panel held that the plaintiffs’ claims
should be dismissed.196 In finding that plaintiffs’ state law tort claims were
federally preempted, the panel broadly construed the exemption in the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for claims “arising out of the combatant activities
of the military or armed forces . . . during time of war.”197 Although plaintiffs
had argued there was no conflict with federal policy because federal law
prohibits torture, the appeals court found that the claims were preempted by a
broader federal policy—embodied in the FTCA’s “combatant activities”
exception—to eliminate tort liability from the battlefield.198 In reaching this
conclusion, the court emphasized the risks of “judicial probing of the

190. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225,
248 (explaining how Iqbal shows that while “[c]hallenges against discrete, isolated, and
unauthorized acts of abuse sometimes prevail, . . . suits targeting allegedly unconstitutional
policies will be turned away at the courthouse door”).
191. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
192. Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring)).
193. Id.
194. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
195. Id. at 17 (Garland, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2, 17 (majority opinion).
197. Id. at 5–6. The panel also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against Titan under
the Alien Tort Statute. Id. at 3, 5.
198. Id. at 7.
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government’s wartime policies,”199 much as other courts had done in applying
the state secrets privilege and Bivens special factors to dismiss lawsuits at the
pleading stage.
A divided Fourth Circuit panel reached a similar conclusion in Al-Shimari
v. CACI International, Inc., another suit by Iraqi nationals against a civilian
contractor retained by the U.S. military to assist it in conducting
interrogations.200 In concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims were federally
preempted for the reasons articulated in Saleh, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district judge’s ruling that discovery was required to determine whether the
interrogations conducted by the contractors constituted “combatant activities”
within the meaning of the FTCA’s exception.201 The panel underscored the
“significant conflict with federal interests” that would result “from allowing
tort law generally to apply to foreign battlefields.”202 Like Saleh, Al-Shimari
presumed that the kind of judicial inquiry associated with tort litigation is
inconsistent with the pursuit of warfare, even when the premise of the litigation
is that civilian contractors acted contrary to or in violation of federal rules and
directives on the treatment of prisoners.203 After agreeing to rehear the AlShimari case en banc,204 the full Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeals on the
ground that the district court’s rulings were not immediately appealable under
the “collateral order” doctrine.205 The en banc court’s decision thus defers any
determination on defendants’ preemption arguments until after further
litigation in the district court.
Other courts have allowed damages actions by U.S. citizen plaintiffs to
proceed past the pleading stage. In Vance v. Rumsfeld, a divided Seventh
Circuit panel upheld the district court’s refusal to dismiss a Bivens claim by
two U.S. citizen civilians against former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
for their torture and mistreatment in Iraq.206 The Seventh Circuit panel

199. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8.
200. Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2011).
201. Id. at 415, 419–20. The panel has also interpreted the collateral order doctrine broadly to
consider the defendants’ interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the suit on
federal preemption grounds. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 203–05 (4th Cir.
2011).
202. Al-Shimari, 658 F.3d at 419.
203. Id.; see also id. at 430 (arguing that the majority’s assertion of this conflict is erroneous
as “[n]o federal interest implicates the torture and abuse of detainees.”) (King, J., dissenting).
204. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, No.
09-1335 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).
205. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., Nos. 09–1335, 10–1891, 10–1921, 2012 WL 1656773, at
*4, *13 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
206. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011). Judge
Manion dissented from the court’s decision to allow the Bivens claims to proceed. See id. at 627–
28, 632 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The U.S. District Court for the
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recognized that litigation involving the treatment of detainees in a war zone
raised concerns about judicial interference with military decision-making.207
But those concerns, it said, did not warrant dismissal where it would leave
plaintiffs with no other remedy and risk immunizing grave constitutional
violations.208 The panel emphasized the importance of U.S. citizenship in
distinguishing Arar, Ali, and Rasul, where the plaintiffs, like those Vance, had
no other judicial remedy and where dismissal meant immunizing egregious
government misconduct.209 If the Vance panel demonstrated more confidence
in the judiciary’s ability to handle the evidentiary challenges litigation of an
overseas detention case posed, it also believed the plaintiffs’ U.S. citizenship
affected whether the judiciary should tackle those challenges and allow the
case to proceed to discovery. The full Seventh Circuit, however, has vacated
the panel’s opinion and agreed to rehear the case en banc.210
Civil litigation involving former “enemy combatant” Jose Padilla has
similarly presented the question of whether U.S. citizens can pursue a damages
remedy for unlawful detention and mistreatment arising out of the war on
terrorism. A district court in South Carolina dismissed Jose Padilla’s Bivens
suit against former government officials for torture and other abuses
committed during his prior military confinement as an enemy combatant,211
while a district court in the Northern District of California ruled that a similar
suit could proceed to discovery.212

District of Columbia refused to dismiss a similar claim for violation of substantive due process by
a former contractor who asserts he was abused by the military in Iraq. See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800
F. Supp. 2d 94, 100–01, 111, 126 (D.D.C. 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-5209 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
22, 2011).
207. Vance, 653 F.3d at 618 (“We are sensitive to the defendants’ concerns that the judiciary
should not interfere with military decision-making.”).
208. Id. at 618, 624 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (plurality
opinion)) (“‘[W]hile we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military
authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of
that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the
courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and
resolving claims.’”).
209. Id. at 619–20, 622 (“The fact that the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens is a key consideration
here as we weigh whether a Bivens action may proceed.”). The court did note that, unlike U.S.
citizens, foreign nationals could petition their own respective governments to seek redress for the
violations. Id. at 620 n.19.
210. Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2011).
211. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (D.S.C. 2011) (dismissing Padilla’s
Bivens suit against Rumsfeld and other government officials for his treatment as an enemy
combatant in the Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina).
212. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012, 1014–15, 1030, 1039–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(denying the motion to dismiss Padilla’s Bivens suit against John Yoo, the former Deputy
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, for his role in the decision to designate Padilla
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On appeal from the South Carolina district court decision, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Padilla’s suit.213 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the military detention and treatment of an enemy combatant
during wartime presented “special factors” counseling hesitation.214 The court
cited both the separation of powers concerns triggered by judicial review of
executive-branch action in this area215 and the judiciary’s limited competence
in adjudicating claims challenging military decisions during wartime.216
Absent affirmative action by Congress to create a damages remedy for enemy
combatants, the court reasoned, judges should stay their Bivens hand.217
The Ninth Circuit also ordered dismissal of Padilla’s separate suit brought
in the Northern District of California, thus reversing the district judge’s
decision in that case.218 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the issue of
Bivens “special factors,” instead resting its decision on the ground that the
defendant, former Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo, was entitled to
qualified immunity.219 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit
did not deem Padilla’s suit non-justiciable but rather concluded that Padilla
was not subjected to treatment that violated any clearly established
constitutional right.220

an enemy combatant and for his subsequent treatment in the Navy brig in Charleston, South
Carolina).
213. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2012).
214. Id. at 548, 551.
215. Id. at 548–52. The court further explained that the need for judicial deference is greatest
where, as in Padilla’s case, the executive acted pursuant to the type of broad delegation of power
contained in the AUMF. Id. at 549–50.
216. Id. at 552–56.
217. Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 513 (1954)) (“[C]reating a
cause of action [under these circumstances] is ‘more appropriately for those who write the laws,
rather than for those who interpret them.’”).
218. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478, 2012 WL 1526156, at *15 (9th Cir. May 2, 2012).
219. Id. at *1, *15.
220. Id. at *1. The appeals court reached its qualified immunity ruling for two reasons: first,
because at the time in question it was not clearly established that an enemy combatant possessed
the same constitutional rights as an ordinary convicted prisoner or accused criminal; and second,
because although it was clearly established that the torture of a U.S. citizen violated the
Constitution, it was not clearly established at the time that the treatment to which Padilla was
subjected amounted to torture. Id. For a critical assessment of the Ninth Circuit’s qualified
immunity analysis, see David Cole, No Accountability for Torture, NYR BLOG (May 7, 2012,
3:05 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/may/07/john-yoo-jose-padilla-torturelawsuit/, and Jonathan Hafetz, The Ninth Circuit’s Dismissal in Padilla: The Accountability Gap
Widens, BALKINIZATION (May 3, 2012, 1:33 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/05/ninthcircuits-dismissal-in-padilla.html.
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The government has also relied on similar “special factors” arguments in
moving to dismiss a lawsuit221 by a U.S. citizen who was secretly rendered,
detained, and mistreated by FBI agents in the Horn of Africa.222 The
government’s motion in that case, Meshal v. Higgenbotham, is pending before
the federal district court in Washington, D.C.223
The outcome of these citizen-damages suits thus remains uncertain, and
U.S. citizen challenges to other national security practices, like targeted killing,
have failed on justiciability grounds.224 Even if, however, courts ultimately
permit citizen-damages suits to proceed past the pleading stage—which looks
increasingly unlikely absent Supreme Court intervention—it would not alter
the non-availability of a federal forum for the larger category of cases brought
by noncitizens that challenge national security detention and interrogation
practices.225 Instead, citizen-damages suits will, at most, represent a narrow
exception to the general bar against civil litigation seeking redress for abuses
in the war on terrorism—an exception rooted in the heightened obligation
courts believe are due U.S. citizens, the rights U.S. citizens possess compared
to noncitizens, and the limited number of citizen-damages cases that are likely
to be brought. U.S. citizen cases, if allowed, will thus proceed not because of a
belief in the judiciary’s ability to address the various concerns surrounding
classified information, military and intelligence operations, and diplomatic
relations, but rather because of a normative determination that such litigation
should be permitted in that narrow category of cases despite those concerns.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS AS NATIONAL SECURITY DETENTION COURTS
Another post-9/11 model for federal court adjudication centers on judicial
review of military detention through the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Here, courts have served two main and interrelated functions: first, as a forum
for examining broader policies concerning the military detention and trial of
terrorism suspects; and second, as a forum for deciding the merits of individual
detainee cases. These functions have been exercised mainly in the context of

221. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Filed by Defendants Chris
Higginbotham, Steve Hersem, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 at 8–18, Meshal v. Higgenbotham,
No. 09-cv-2178-EGS (D.D.C. June 23, 2010), ECF No. 33 [hereinafter Higgenbotham’s Motion
to Dismiss].
222. Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Meshal v.
Higgenbotham, No. 09-cv-2178-EGS (D.D.C. May 10, 2010), ECF No. 31. I am co-counsel with
the American Civil Liberties Union for the plaintiff Amir Meshal in this lawsuit.
223. See Higgenbotham’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 221.
224. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8, 11, 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, for
lack of standing and on political question grounds, a “next friend” lawsuit by father of U.S.
citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, challenging his son’s placement on the U.S. government’s “targeted
killing” list based on his son’s alleged terrorist activities in Yemen).
225. See supra note 134 (collecting cases brought by noncitizens).
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the Guantánamo detainee litigation, where courts have largely accepted and
accommodated the government’s adoption of a new form of detention outside
the criminal justice system even as they have selectively resisted the
executive’s effort to deprive them of any role in determining its contours.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,226 Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,227 and Boumediene v. Bush,228 all illustrate how the judiciary can
serve as a forum for review of war on terror detention practices. Hamdi and
Boumediene demonstrate how courts, through the exercise of their habeas
jurisdiction, can examine both the category of individuals who may be lawfully
held in military custody and the process they must be afforded to justify their
continued confinement. In Hamdi, the Court held that the President’s AUMFbased military detention authority extended, at minimum, to individuals who
were part of or were supporting forces hostile to the United States in
Afghanistan and who engaged in armed conflict against the United States or its
coalition partners there.229 Such individuals, the Court said, could be detained
as enemy combatants for the duration of the armed conflict.230 The Court left
further development of the parameters of the enemy combatant category to
future cases.231 While it cautioned against expanding that category too far,232
the Court nevertheless sanctioned the theory that enemy-combatant detention
provided an alternative to federal criminal detention and that those properly
categorized as enemy combatants could be held indefinitely to prevent their
“return to the battlefield.”233
Four years later, in Boumediene, the Court reaffirmed that judges
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction in Guantánamo detainee cases could
determine the legitimate scope of the government’s AUMF-based military
detention authority, but did not further address the scope of that authority.234

226. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
227. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
228. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
229. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–18 (plurality opinion).
230. Id. at 521.
231. Id. at 522 n.1.
232. Id. at 521 (noting that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war,” the
“understanding” that the AUMF authorizes detention “may unravel”).
233. Id. at 519.
234. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788 (noting that courts, as part of their constitutionally
mandated habeas jurisdiction, must have authority to consider the petitioners’ “most basic claim:
that the President has no authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely”); see also id. at
790 (“If a detainee can present reasonably available evidence demonstrating there is no basis for
his continued detention, he must have the opportunity to present this evidence to a habeas corpus
court.”). In Hamdan, the Court suggested the government had continued authority to militarily
detain at least some individuals seized in the non-international armed conflict against al Qaeda,
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Since Boumediene, however, lower courts have elaborated on that standard in
adjudicating individual habeas petitions, determining that the President has
authority under the AUMF to detain individuals who were part of or who
supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities with the United States or its coalition partners.235 These courts have
extended AUMF-based detention authority beyond the narrow circumstances
present in Hamdi, refusing to limit that authority to individuals who were
captured on a battlefield or who took part in the armed conflict in Afghanistan
(as opposed to the global armed conflict against al Qaeda and associated
forces).236
Hamdi and Boumediene also addressed the process to which the petitioners
were entitled in challenging their law-of-war-based detention under the
AUMF. In both cases, the Court found the existing process inadequate—under
the Due Process Clause in Hamdi237 and under the Suspension Clause in
Boumediene238—and ordered individualized judicial determinations to remedy
the defect.
Although the decisions rested on different constitutional
provisions, they both maintained that a constitutionally adequate process had to
provide detainees with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the government’s
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.239 The decisions also acknowledged
that a military tribunal could provide an adequate fact-finding process if it
contained sufficient procedural safeguards.240 But where the military factfinding process was as deficient or tainted by bias as it was in Hamdi and
Boumediene, the Due Process Clause (Hamdi) and Suspension Clause
but it did not further elaborate on the scope of that authority. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
635 (2006).
235. See, e.g., Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d
720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
236. See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding
grant of habeas petition for further fact-finding; assuming, without discussing, that a petitioner
could be militarily detained as “part of” al Qaeda even if he lacked connection to the armed
conflict in Afghanistan).
237. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537–38 (plurality opinion) (holding that the military process
provided to petitioner fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause’s requirement of adequate notice and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision-maker).
238. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792, 798 (holding that review of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal determinations under the restrictive standards of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
does not provide an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus).
239. Id. at 744–45; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
240. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783–85 (suggesting, by reference to the CSRT’s
shortcomings, what an adequate fact-finding process would require in cases of executive
detention); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (noting that a properly constituted military tribunal could
provide an adequate fact-finding process for individuals seized on the battlefield during armed
conflict). The Suspension Clause would additionally require collateral review through habeas to
correct errors in that process. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786. The scope and intensity of that
habeas review would depend in part on the robustness of that underlying process. Id.
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(Boumediene) required judicial fact-finding to remedy the flaws.241 In Hamdi,
the Court’s ruling meant that the petitioner was entitled to a judicial
determination of whether he fell within the enemy combatant category, as
defined by the Court in that case;242 in Boumediene, it meant that the
petitioners and all other Guantánamo detainees were entitled to a judicial
determination of whether there was a lawful basis to hold them.243 Moreover,
the Boumediene Court ruled that judicial determination had to allow for
independent fact-finding in order to satisfy the Suspension Clause.244 While
Hamdi and Boumediene said that the judicial review must be meaningful, they
also instructed lower courts to take into account the government’s legitimate
security interests in establishing a framework for review of individual detainee
cases.245 Ultimately, the Court left it to lower courts to resolve the various
evidentiary and procedural issues presented by the habeas litigation in the first
instance.246
Hamdan involved a similar exercise of judicial review, only there the
Court examined the legality of trying detainees in military commissions rather
than holding them in law-of-war detention.247 Hamdan invalidated the military
commissions created by President Bush because they failed to conform to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) 248 and, by incorporation,

241. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“[W]e agree with petitioners that, even when all the
parties involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of
error in the tribunal’s findings of fact . . . [which] is a risk too significant to ignore.”); Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 537–38.
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
243. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
244. Id. at 732, 788–89 (finding that federal appellate review of military CSRT
determinations under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 does not provide an “adequate and
effective” substitute for habeas review because, inter alia, the appeals court cannot consider new
evidence produced by the detainee).
245. See id. at 796 (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of the evidentiary and access-tocounsel issues that will arise during the course of the detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings. We
recognize, however, that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and
methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the District Court will use its discretion to
accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34
(explaining that “enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict” and noting, for example,
that “[h]earsay . . . may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the
Government in such a proceeding” and that “the Constitution would not be offended by a
presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided”).
246. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 (leaving various “evidentiary and access-to-counsel” issues
to the “expertise and competence” of the district courts to address in the first instance).
247. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
248. Id. at 567.
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which the Court held applied to
all prisoners detained in connection with the armed conflict against al Qaeda (a
conflict whose scope the Court declined to define with any precision).249 The
Court’s decision had three principal effects on U.S. national security policy.
First, it enforced a statutorily based requirement of conformity between
military commissions and courts-martial, which in turn required conformity
with the law of war.250 Second, Hamdan mandated baseline protections for the
treatment of all prisoners in U.S. custody in the war on terror by rejecting the
administration’s contention that enemy combatants fell outside the ambit of
Common Article 3.251 Third, the decision, which was grounded in the
executive’s failure to adhere to congressional requirements, invited subsequent
legislative action in the field.252 “Nothing,” as Justice Breyer explained in his
concurrence, “prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary.”253
Congress would take up this invitation twice—authorizing military
commissions four months after Hamdan in the Military Commissions Act
(“MCA”) of 2006254 and then further modifying the commissions three years
later.255 Created in the shadow of Hamdan, these new commissions would
contain procedural safeguards that earlier commissions lacked, including
greater opportunities for defendants to confront the evidence against them and
stricter protections against the use of evidence obtained through coercion.256
The 2009 revisions, moreover, eliminated a provision precluding defendants
from challenging the commissions for failing to comply with Common Article
3.257 The new commissions did not, however, resolve concerns surrounding

249. Id. at 630, 631 & n.63, 635.
250. Id. at 613.
251. Id. at 630–32.
252. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (noting the military commission lacked power to proceed
because it violated the UCMJ as passed by Congress).
253. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
254. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b, 120 Stat. 2600, 2602
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b).
255. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190,
2574–2614 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2010)).
256. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948q(b)–948r, 949j (Supp. III 2010).
257. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Ratcheting Back: International Law as a Constraint on
Executive Power, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 523, 533 (2010) (noting that while the 2006 MCA
“could be read to prevent commission defendants from invoking Geneva as any ‘source of rights,’
even in defense against a criminal action against them, [the 2009 MCA] appeared to prevent
defendants only from relying on Geneva to create a separate cause of action in federal court,” thus
enabling them to claim Geneva’s continued availability as applicable law in their commission
case).
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the admission of hearsay evidence,258 nor did it significantly alter the
government’s substantive power to try noncitizens in commissions, including
for offenses like material support for terrorism259 that are generally not
recognized as war crimes under international law.260
These three decisions suggest the potential role of federal courts in
influencing U.S. detention policy in the war on terror. As a general matter, the
Court found that at least some military counterterrorism detentions are a proper
subject for judicial review, even if they arise in connection with an armed
conflict and notwithstanding the government’s warnings about interference
with core executive functions. Hamdi and Boumediene demonstrate the
Court’s willingness to impose constitutionally based process requirements,
whether through the Due Process Clause or the Suspension Clause, to provide
detainees with an opportunity to challenge the allegations against them in a
judicial forum. Hamdan’s holding on the applicability of Common Article 3 to
the armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces—with its prohibition
not only on torture but also on lesser forms of mistreatment261—reflects the
Court’s willingness to impose baseline standards for the treatment of detainees
and its aversion to a legal vacuum.
The decisions, however, also demonstrate judicial hesitation in reviewing
substantive detention standards.262 Although the Court has made clear that the
permissible scope of the “enemy combatant” category is a judicial question, it
has shown no great enthusiasm for answering it, whether by crafting a narrow
holding in Hamdi,263 declining to address the question in Boumediene,264 or
258. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1033 (2009) (cautioning that “the continued admissibility of hearsay
creates real concern that the government might circumvent MCA 2009’s prohibitions on
admission of evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”).
259. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25).
260. See David Weissbrodt & Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military
Commissions in Light of Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353,
362 n.48, 364 (2008).
261. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
262. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1015–16, 1028 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s extensive focus on procedural questions
at the expense of addressing larger substantive questions surrounding the scope of the executive’s
detention authority); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 (2011) (describing the Court’s failure to review the substantive
detention standard applied in the Guantanamo habeas cases).
263. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion).
264. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). Several petitioners in Boumediene had
pressed the issue of the permissible scope of AUMF-based detention. See Brief for the
Boumediene Petitioners at 33–43, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195), 2007
WL 2441590 at *33–43.
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allowing the government to moot the habeas challenges in Padilla v. Hanft265
and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.266 In Padilla and al-Marri, the government
avoided a Supreme Court determination on the outer reaches of the President’s
military detention power by bringing criminal charges against the petitioners
and returning them to civilian custody after years of military detention.267
Additionally, apart from its process-based rulings in Hamdi and Boumediene,
which looked to constitutional norms in mandating judicial review of
executive-branch assessments about detainees, the Court rested its decisions on
statutory grounds. Thus, while Hamdan noted the constitutional limits of the
executive’s authority to create military commissions that contravened existing
legislation,268 it did not question Congress’s authority to create new military
commissions nor did it establish any constitutional constraints on that
The Court’s Suspension Clause holding in Boumediene,
authority.269
moreover, occurred only after the Court had previously attempted to address its
concerns about unreviewable executive detention in Rasul v. Bush through
statutory interpretation,270 and subsequent congressional court-stripping
legislation left no alternative except to ground the right to judicial review in the
Constitution.271
Since Boumediene, lower courts have addressed various questions that the
Supreme Court left open in the course of exercising their habeas jurisdiction

265. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006).
266. 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.
Ct. 1545 (2009).
267. See al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1545; Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1063; Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1064
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Padilla and al-Marri, the Bush Administration claimed the legal
authority to seize suspected terrorists arrested in the United States and detain them indefinitely as
enemy combatants as part of the global armed conflict against al Qaeda. Padilla, 547 U.S. at
1062 (majority opinion); id. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 217 (Motz,
J., concurring). In Padilla, this power was applied to a U.S. citizen. Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1062
(majority opinion). In al-Marri, to a noncitizen who had lawfully entered the country. Al-Marri,
534 F.3d at 219.
268. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (“Whether or not the President
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he
may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed
on his powers.”), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600.
269. See id. at 594–95.
270. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 477–78, 484 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo detainees
have a right to challenge their detention under the federal habeas corpus statute, but declining to
decide whether the detainees have a constitutionally protected right to habeas corpus under the
Suspension Clause).
271. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (finding that section seven of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus).
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and resolving individual Guantánamo detainee petitions. Together, the D.C.
Circuit and district courts have thus far decided approximately eighty
Guantánamo detainee cases.272 In determining whether a particular petitioner’s
detention is lawful, these courts have addressed various questions affecting
U.S. detention practices, including the standard under which individuals may
be confined pursuant to the AUMF,273 the evidentiary rules governing the
habeas review process,274 and the remedy available to those petitioners whose
detention has been found unlawful.275 The results of this lower court habeas
litigation reveal a marked shift over time: in the first nineteen months after
Boumediene, district courts granted thirty-three of the forty-four habeas
petitions they decided;276 since then, the D.C. Circuit has decided sixteen
appeals ruling for the government in all except two cases.277 Since the D.C.
Circuit began reviewing district habeas decisions and articulating rules that
make it more difficult for a detainee to prevail, district courts have increasingly
ruled in the government’s favor—a trend that has accelerated sharply with the
number of D.C. Circuit decisions.278
The D.C. Circuit has upheld a more expansive AUMF-based detention
standard than either the Supreme Court applied in Hamdi279 or the district

272. See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus After
Boumediene, 56 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). District courts have issued merits
decisions in sixty-three Guantánamo habeas cases, and the D.C. Circuit has decided sixteen
appeals from these cases. See id.; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After
Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1453–54 (2011) (noting the deep divide these cases
have caused between the D.C. Circuit and D.C. District Courts).
273. See Vladeck, supra note 272, at 1456–65.
274. See id. at 1466, 1469–73.
275. See id. at 1476–88.
276. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 853 n.8, 861 (2010).
277. Hafetz, supra note 272. In those two cases, the D.C. Circuit reversed a habeas denial
and remanded for further proceedings. Id. For the remaining cases, the breakdown is as follows:
in eight cases, the appeals court affirmed a habeas denial; in three cases, it reversed a habeas grant
and directed judgment for the government; and in three cases it vacated a habeas grant and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Hafetz, supra note 272; E-mail
from Brian Foster to author (Oct. 14, 2011, 17:08) (on file with author).
278. Since July 2010, for example, district judges have not granted any Guantánamo habeas
petitions, while denying ten petitions—yet twenty-two habeas petitions were granted, with only
fifteen denied in the two previous years. Editorial, Reneging on Justice at Guantánamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at SR 10; see also MARK DENBEAUX & JONATHAN HAFETZ, SETON HALL
LAW CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, NO HEARING HABEAS: D.C. CIRCUIT RESTRICTS
MEANINGFUL REVIEW 1, 6 (2012) (describing the impact of D.C. Circuit decisions on district
court fact-finding in Guantánamo habeas cases and tracking the increasing rate of acceptance of
by district judges of the government’s allegations), available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCen
ters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/upload/no-hearing-habeas.pdf.
279. See supra notes 229–33 and accompanying text.
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courts recognized in post-Boumediene Guantánamo detainee habeas cases.280
The appeals court has ruled that individuals may be held in military detention
if they were part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces or purposefully
and materially supported such forces in hostilities against the United States or
its allies.281 In applying this standard, the Circuit has rejected any rigid test,
such as one that would require the government to show that detainees received
and executed orders as part of the enemy organization’s “command structure,”
in favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach.282 It has not required that
the petitioner was on a battlefield or directly participated in hostilities.283
While most of the Guantánamo habeas cases involve detainees apprehended in
connection with the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit has not
placed any geographic limit on the government’s military detention power or
otherwise suggested that the conflict itself is territorially limited.284
The D.C. Circuit has also upheld the use of hearsay evidence285 and
rejected efforts by detainees to invoke rights under the Constitution’s
Confrontation Clause.286 Most significantly, the D.C. Circuit has required
district courts to take a highly deferential approach to the government’s
evidence. It has repeatedly criticized district judges for failing to view the
government’s evidence in its totality and focusing instead on specific
weaknesses in its case.287 Some D.C. Circuit judges have suggested that the
government’s evidence in Guantánamo detainee habeas cases should be
subjected merely to a “some evidence” test, rather than to the more rigorous

280. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3) (focusing
on whether an individual “‘receive[s] and execute[s] orders’ from [the enemy organization’s]
‘command structure’” in determining whether that individual is “part of” al Qaeda and thus
detainable under the AUMF), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
see also Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying a similar “command
structure” test), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
281. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
282. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 400, 403.
283. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869, 873.
284. Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750–51 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that the AUMF
would authorize the detention of an individual seized in Mauritania and who was not alleged to
have taken part in the current armed conflict in Afghanistan because the relevant inquiry was
whether the defendant was “part of” al-Qaida when captured).
285. E.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that hearsay is always
admissible in detainee habeas cases and that the operative question is what weight to give it); AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 879.
286. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (ruling that the rights protected under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause apply only to criminal trials).
287. See, e.g., Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753 (criticizing the district judge for taking an “unduly
atomized” view of the government’s evidence); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105–06
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (same).
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preponderance of the evidence standard that the government itself has
advocated.288 The Circuit has further ruled that district judges must presume
the accuracy of government intelligence reports unless rebutted by the
petitioner,289 causing the dissenting judge to note that the ruling “comes
perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be
treated as true.”290 With such a ruling, the dissent explained, “it is hard to see
what is left of the Supreme Court’s command in Boumediene that habeas
review be ‘meaningful.’”291 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has held that
district courts have no authority to order the release of a prisoner into the
United States—even if the prisoner prevails on his habeas petition but cannot
be safely returned to his home country or repatriated to a third country.292
These post-Boumediene lower court decisions provide an additional
perspective on federal court review of post-9/11 detention cases. In evaluating
the lawfulness of an individual petitioner’s law-of-war-based confinement,
they have served as de facto national security detention courts. Through a
common law process of adjudication, they have developed substantive and
procedural rules for a new form of executive confinement based on an
individual’s participation in, support for, or connection to a global armed
conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.293 (Congress recently

288. See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring)
(advocating the adoption of a more deferential approach to the government’s evidence); see also
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4. The D.C. Circuit has rejected arguments by detainees that the
Constitution requires a more rigorous standard than preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 878.
289. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
290. Id. at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).
291. Id.
292. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that district
courts have no authority to order the release of a prisoner, whose habeas petition was successful,
into the United States); see also Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(upholding continued indefinite detention of prisoners under such circumstances). The Court had
previously granted certiorari to determine “whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction
has the power to order the release of” a Guantánamo detainee into the United States, where such
release is the only effective remedy. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010).
Before the case was argued, however, the U.S. government had obtained offers of resettlement for
all of the Kiyemba petitioners. Id. The Court, accordingly, vacated the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
holding that federal courts had no power to order release, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022,
1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and remanded to the appeals court to reconsider the case in light of these
new facts. Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235. The D.C. Circuit subsequently reinstated its prior
determination that federal courts have no power to order a Guantanamo detainee’s release into the
United States under any circumstance. Kiyemba, 605 F.3d at 1048. This time, the Court denied
certiorari. Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631, 1631 (2011).
293. See supra notes 273–92 and accompanying text. See Baher Azmy, Executive Detention,
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 505 (2010)
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ratified the D.C. Circuit’s broad construction of the President’s detention
power under the AUMF, expressly authorizing the detention of individuals
who were part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces).294 Detentions remain subject to judicial review via habeas
corpus under Boumediene.295 But they are examined under standards and
procedures that provide substantial latitude and a heightened degree of
deference to the government.296 Boumediene, like Hamdi, may extol federal
courts as providing an important checking function by protecting “the rights of
the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
The post-Boumediene litigation, however, has
jailer to account.”297
significantly cabined that review function and rendered it of little practical
effect.
Two other considerations are relevant to understanding federal-court
review of post-9/11 detentions. First, not all national security detentions are
subject to judicial review. The current statutory framework does not expressly
provide for habeas jurisdiction over overseas detentions, while explicitly
barring the exercise of that jurisdiction over noncitizens detained as enemy
combatants.298 Under Boumediene, the availability of habeas jurisdiction
under the Suspension Clause for overseas detentions is determined by a
functional test that examines “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made;
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place;
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement
to the writ.”299 The application of this test may have compelled habeas
jurisdiction over detentions at Guantánamo, but it has not led to habeas review
over detentions at Bagram, where the D.C. Circuit has deemed the Suspension
Clause not to extend.300 Thus, even as Boumediene establishes the potential
for federal courts’ review of overseas counterterrorism detentions by rejecting
any categorical bars to jurisdiction based on a prisoner’s citizenship or

(recognizing the expanded definition of “enemy combatant” to any individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces).
294. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, § 1021,
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). The D.C. Circuit had previously held that the AUMF authorized the
military detention of individuals who were part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces or
purposefully and materially supported such forces in hostilities against the United States or its
allies. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
295. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786–87 (2008).
296. See supra notes 285–90 and accompanying text.
297. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
298. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
299. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
300. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Boumediene and
finding that the Suspension Clause does not apply to U.S. detentions at Bagram).
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location,301 it allows for continued extrajudicial detention, depending on how
its multi-factored test is applied.
Boumediene, moreover, does not address proxy detention, where actual
U.S. direction and control is masked by a foreign sovereign’s nominal exercise
of custody over a prisoner.302 Although one district court has held that habeas
jurisdiction can be asserted over proxy detentions on a theory of constructive
custody,303 establishing the factual basis for such custody is difficult given the
potentially secret and fluid nature of the custodial arrangements. Whether
there is any federal court review of constructive custody cases thus depends
largely on a judge’s willingness to allow jurisdictional discovery to flesh out
those custodial arrangements in the face of government objections that such
discovery will “interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign nation
and encroach on sensitive foreign policy concerns.”304
Second, not all claims are subject to judicial review even where habeas
jurisdiction exists, as the post-Boumediene Guantánamo detainee litigation
shows.305 The D.C. Circuit has held that judges cannot review the executive’s
decision to transfer a prisoner to another country, even where that prisoner
claims it would result in their likely torture or continued imprisonment.306 It
has also denied habeas review when sought by former Guantánamo detainees
based on the collateral consequences flowing from their prior—and still
unrescinded— designation as enemy combatants.307 Thus, to the extent
Boumediene creates a role for federal courts as national security detention
courts—to review counterterrorism detentions outside the criminal justice
system—that role has been confined to a limited category of detentions as well
as a limited scope of claims.
As a result of the Guantánamo habeas corpus litigation, courts have helped
shape the broader rules governing war on terrorism detentions and
prosecutions as well as evaluated the merits of individual detainee cases. In its
trio of “enemy combatant” decisions—Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene—the
Supreme Court created the possibility of judicial oversight by rejecting strict

301. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 747, 771.
302. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens,
52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 850 n.601 (2011).
303. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 68 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that habeas
jurisdiction would lie over a U.S. citizen detained abroad by a foreign government if the United
States actually exercised custody or control over the detention).
304. HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 197–98.
305. See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2010).
306. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
307. Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 14, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the dismissal of
habeas petitions by former Guantánamo detainees challenging their unrescinded designation as
enemy combatants and holding that the collateral consequences of that designation did not satisfy
justiciability requirements under Article III).
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territorial limits on the Constitution’s application; enforced separation of
powers principles by requiring legislative authorization for military
commissions; rejected the notion that war-on-terrorism detentions are exempt
from international norms; and mandated individualized judicial review of
Guantánamo detainee habeas cases.308
Guantánamo thus can no longer be described as a legal black hole:
detainees there have access to the courts through habeas corpus—however
limited the habeas right may be—and substantive protections under Common
Article 3. Further, just as Suspension Clause-mandated habeas review has
provided greater legitimacy to AUMF-based detentions, post-Hamdan
congressional reforms to military commissions have enhanced their viability as
an alternative to federal criminal prosecution through a process of
legalization.309 Guantánamo, in short, has become a competing model to
federal criminal prosecution for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism
suspects—a model whose more limited procedural protections and laxer
evidentiary standards, its supporters argue, are justified by the government’s
need to protect intelligence sources and methods, the dangers of interfering
with military operations, and the limited competence of the judiciary in matters
affecting national security. If the post-9/11 habeas litigation suggests the
resilience of judicial review, it also accepts a judicial role that is less public,
less protective of individual rights, and less willing to scrutinize the
government’s evidence than terrorism prosecutions in Article III courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In Representing Justice, Professors Resnik and Curtis remind us of the
importance of contextualizing the post-9/11 shift towards military tribunals
within a larger, decades-long transformation of courts in the United States.310
Focusing only on apparent change, they note, obscures continuities, including
how the United States relies increasingly on non-Article III forums and
alternative dispute mechanisms to resolve controversies.311 This Article argues
that this increased reliance on alternative methods of adjudication, in turn,
affects the perception and operation of Article III courts. In particular, the
Article demonstrates how the creation of an alternative military detention
system after 9/11 has transformed federal courts, reshaping their role as forums
for criminal prosecutions and civil damages actions, while creating a new
species of federal adjudication in which courts hear challenges to detentions
under this alternative system.

308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 226–53 and accompanying text.
See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 327–28.
Id. at 334–35.
Id. at 335.

